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Abstract
This paper introduces the impact factor set, which includes 
input cost value, risk share coefficient, leadership in 
industry, market influence and the desire of participation, 
to revise the classic Shapley value, and use the revised 
Shapely value to research the profit allocation problem 
of an E-commerce logistics enterprise alliance under 
the circumstance of warehouse overload. A numerical 
example is presented to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
revised Shapely value. The result indicates that the revised 
Shapely value can objectively reflect the regulating 
effect of impact factors, show the differences between 
the core enterprise and general enterprises in an alliance, 
and promote the rationality and equity of alliance profit 
allocation.
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INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of cross-border E-commerce, the 
global online retail market is booming, which drives the 
expansion of the scale of E-commerce express delivery. 
In this case, warehouse overload has become a typical 
problem for many E-commerce logistics enterprises, 
especially in developing countries whose logistics 
infrastructure is still low-level. In order to face increasing 
competitive pressure, as well as environmental uncertainty, 
E-commerce logistics enterprises need to invest massively 
in technology, management, human resources and fixed 
assets. However, the ability of any single enterprise 
is always limited. The successful case of Fedex Trade 
Networks Services has demonstrated that, cooperation can 
effectively reduce corporate operation cost, improve the 
efficiency of resource allocation, and realize sustainable 
development. Thus, cooperation alliance becomes a 
necessary means to maintain competitive advantage and 
to deal with market risk for enterprises. In order to ensure 
the establishment and stabilization of the alliance, a 
reasonable profit allocation mechanism is key. However, 
there is little research regarding how to distribute profit in 
the E-commerce logistics enterprise alliance, especially 
under the circumstance of warehouse overload.
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1  Profit Allocation of Logistics Alliance
Few scholars conduct research on the profit allocation of 
logistics enterprise alliance. For example, He and Guo 
(2005) applied the sealed-bid auction model to profit 
allocation problem of vertical logistics alliances. Wang 
and Feng (2008) considered the different statuses of 
members in a virtual logistics alliance and established 
the profit allocation mechanism based on Nash model. 
Wu (2009) set up a two-stage process model for the 
profit allocation of dynamic logistics alliances. Yan et al. 
(2010) presented a cooperation game model for the profit 
allocation problem of small and medium size logistics 
enterprise alliances, and took the influence of leading 
enterprise into account. 
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1.2  Classic Shapely Value
As a classic method to allocate alliance profit, scholars 
have done a lot of applied research on Shapely value. 
Krajewska and Kopfer (2008) discussed the profit 
allocation mechanism of horizontal cooperation among 
freight carriers and verified the feasibility of Shapely 
value. Liu et al. (2010) formulated the less-than-truckload 
collaboration game and allocated carrier-alliance profit 
using Proportional Allocation, Shapely value and 
Nucleolus respectively. Xue et al. (2014) applied the 
Shapely method to solve the game of air pollution control 
among Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei provinces in China. 
Wang et al. (2015) proposed a Shapely value model based 
on cooperative game theory to obtain the optimal profit 
allocation strategy among distribution centers. 
1.3  Revised Shapely Value
Classic Shapely value distributes profit only based 
on participants’ marginal contribution to the alliance 
respectively, which overlooks other impact factors’ 
influences on the alliance profit allocation. In this case, 
scholars have tried a lot of methods to modify it. Medda 
(2007) considered that risk coefficient was a key factor 
which affected the alliance profit allocation. Shen et al. 
(2003) and Long et al. (2009) both considered the impact 
of discount factor. Hu et al. (2011) proposed a model 
which included investment ratio, risk share coefficient 
and the degree of contract completion to allocate profit 
between private and public sections in PPP projects. Xie 
and Dou (2012) introduced the desire of participants to 
improve the traditional Shapely value method and applied 
it to the low-carbon economy game. Liu and Wang (2013) 
analyzed the profit allocation in Technology Innovation 
Alliance game model of industrial chain and considered 
the technology innovation level as an impact factor. 
Based on the aforementioned discussion, first, there 
is no discussion about how to use the Shapely method 
to solve the profit allocation problem of E-commerce 
logistics alliances, especially under the circumstance of 
warehouse overload. Second, former studies only consider 
the regulating effect of single impact factor, but neglect 
the synthetic effect of multi-factor. Third, some discussed 
impact factors should be subdivided and analyzed more 
carefully. Therefore, we propose an impact factor set to 
revise the classic Shapely value, and subsequently apply 
it to the profit allocation problem of an E-commerce 
logistics enterprise alliance under the circumstance of 
warehouse overload.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In 
Section 2, we analyze impact factors which will influence 
the profit allocation of E-commerce logistics enterprise 
alliances, and then introduce how to measure these 
factors. In Section 3, we introduce the classic Shapely 
value first, and then establish the revised impact factor 
set to improve it. In Section 4, we establish a model of 
warehouse overload and a numerical example is presented 
to demonstrate the feasibility of  the revised Shapely 
value.
2 .  IMPACT FACTORS OF  PROFIT 
A L L O C AT I O N  I N  E - C O M M E R C E 
LOGISTICS ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE 
2.1 Impact Factors Analysis
2.1.1 Input Cost Value
To establish an alliance, E-commerce logistics enterprises 
need to invest in logistics infrastructure (e.g. warehouse 
facilities, transportation vehicles, intelligent terminals), 
information system (e.g. RFID, ERP, ITS), human 
resources (e.g. postmen, technicians, administrators) and 
so on. In accordance with Resource-Based View (RBV), 
heterogeneity of organizational resources results in the 
differentiation of competitive advantages directly (Zeng, 
Lü, & Wu, 2014). Likewise, the value of corporate input 
cost is closely related to the uniqueness and scarcity of 
its resources. Therefore, the profitability of different 
investments varies a lot accordingly. Ordinary and useless 
input cannot be the reason for receiving high expected 
profit. However, many former studies only consider the 
investment amount, but neglect the value (or quality) of 
it. In view of this, we consider the Input Cost Value as an 
impact factor that influences the alliance profit allocation 
greatly.
2.1.2 Risk Share Coefficient
No matter to cooperate with others or not, E-commerce 
logistics enterprises always face risks from external 
environments and themselves, such as freight security, 
service quality, capital turnover, change of policies and so 
on. On one hand, based on Utility Theory, an enterprise 
who takes more risks should get a vantage position in 
profit allocation accordingly. On the other hand, whether 
or not a member enterprise can prevent and handle 
risks effectively is significant to the stabilization and 
sustainability of the alliance. In view of this, we consider 
the risk share coefficient as a key factor that affects the 
final profit allocation.
2.1.3  Leadership in Industry
Former studies usually regarded the enterprise status as an 
integral factor when they revised the classic Shapely value 
(Wang & Feng, 2008; Yan, Zhao, & Luo, 2010) which is 
too macroscopic to measure. In view of this, based on the 
different objects of corporate influence, we subdivide the 
enterprise status into 2 facets, leadership in industry and 
market influence.
Leadership in industry shows the enterprise impact 
on other companies. In the E-commerce logistics 
industry, some enterprises may possess great leadership 
due to their corporate scale, distinctive resources, core 
competitiveness, and so forth. An enterprise with great 
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leadership can take advantage of its own peculiarities to 
attract or persuade other common enterprises to follow 
its behavior, and push forward the alliance establishment. 
We deem that this particular ability of leading enterprises 
is mainly embodied in the decision-making authority 
during the negotiation of building an alliance. The greater 
leadership an enterprise possesses in the industry, the 
more contributions it makes to the establishment of the 
alliance. Considering this, the specific contributions of 
leading enterprises should also be reflected in the final 
profit allocation. 
2.1.4  Market Influence
Market influence shows the enterprise impact on 
consumers. E-commerce logistics enterprises can get 
massive user data and feedback from express delivery, 
which is the only stage that has immediate contact with 
end consumers in the O2O chain. By integrating the 
obtained information effectively, the logistics alliance 
is able to understand the market trends, improve the 
service quality, and then further enlarge its market share. 
In view of this, user information actually becomes an 
invisible investment, which will be largely converted into 
a resource for the whole alliance during the collaboration. 
Based on the Attraction Model of Market Share (Bell, 
Keeney, & Little, 1975), enterprises with greater market 
influence can gain more user information and customer 
resources, as well as more power to promote the market 
share and profitability of the alliance. Therefore, we 
consider the corporate market influence as an invisible 
contribution to the alliance, which indeed affects the profit 
allocation.
2.1.5  The Desire of Participation
In order to meet different demands of delivery speed, 
freight security and other personalized requirements, 
each E-commerce logistics enterprise has a specific 
market positioning. Accordingly, for each enterprise, the 
desire of joining an alliance varies based on the corporate 
strategy. If joining the alliance brings great benefits to 
the enterprise, its desire of participation will advance 
in proportion. However, the bargaining power of an 
enterprise weakens along with the advance in the desire of 
participation (Long, Peng, & Iwamura, 2009). The reason 
is that, in order to build the alliance, enterprises with 
higher desire of participation have to transfer part of its 
allocated profits to other potential members whose desire 
is lower than the average level. Therefore, the desire 
of participation is inversely proportional to the profit 
allocated.
2.2  Impact Factor Measurement 
2.2.1  Input Cost Value
In accordance with Resource-Based View (RBV), the 
value of different input cost varies a lot. Therefore, let 
n be the number of enterprises,? ? ??? ?? . minput denotes 
the number of different input costs. αt denotes the value 
coefficient of input cost t, where. denotes the amount of 
input cost t that enterprise i invests. cvi denotes the total 
input cost value of enterprise i. Thus,
��� � ∑ α�������������� ���� � ���� � � �� . 
 2.2.2 Risk Share Coefficient
Due to the different probabilities and consequences of 
risks, let mrisk be the number of different risks. rk denotes 
the probability of risk k. wk denotes the weight coefficient 
of risk k. βi,k denotes the share of enterprise i for risk k, 
where ∑ ���� � ������ �� � ���� � �������.  cri denotes the 
total risk share of enterprise i. Thus,
??? ?? ????????
?????
???
? ?? ? ???? ? ? ?? .
Considering that risks are always uncertain and hard to 
quantify, it is suggested to use AHP-fuzzy comprehensive 
evaluation method to measure the parameters above (He, 
Wu, & Jiang, 2014). 
2.2.3  Leadership in Industry
An enterprise’s leadership in the industry is mainly 
embodied in the decision-making authority during 
the negotiation regarding building an alliance. In fact, 
potential members usually decide whether to build the 
alliance or not by voting. If the aggregate votes exceed 
a specific threshold value (e.g. 50%), the alliance is 
built. The greater leadership an enterprise possesses in 
the industry, the greater decision-making authority it 
commands.
Let Di (i=1, 2…, n) denotes the decision-making 
authori ty for  enterprise i ,  ∑ �� � �� � � �� � �������  
where T denotes the decision point. When, ∑ �� � �����  
the alliance is built. Enterprise j (j=1, 2…, n) is the key 
enterprise if and only if, ∑ �� � ������� ,∑ �� � �� � �������  
qi denotes the number of times that enterprise i becomes 
the key enterprise, where ∑ �� � ������ � ��   denotes the 
frequency that enterprise i becomes the key enterprise, 
thus ?? ?
??
?? . The higher Θi indicates that enterprise i 
has greater decision-making authority in industry and 
makes more contributions to the establishment of alliance. 
Therefore, we use Θ i to represent the leadership in 
industry.
2.2.4  Market Influence
From the view of marketing, market influence, which 
affects the trust and buying-behavior of consumers, is 
composed of corporate brand and reputation. According 
to the empirical study of Fombrum and Van Riel (2004), 
good brand image and reputation have significant impact 
on the corporate market share. Thus, we use the market 
share of an enterprise to measure its market influence. 
Let  (i=1,2…,n) be the market share of enterprise i, where 
0≤Si≤1.
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2.2.5  The Desire of Participation
For an enterprise, its decision on whether joining an 
alliance or not is always driven by profit. Thus, we use 
the change rate of expected profit before and after the 
establishment of alliance to measure an enterprise’s desire 
of participation. 
Let Ei and E'i denote the expected profit of enterprise i 
before and after the establishment of alliance respectively. 
??? ? ??
??   denotes the change rate. hi denotes the desire 
of participation for enterprise i. Suppose that if joining 
the alliance has few or negative impact on expected 
profit, the enterprise has no desire to participate, thus 
�� � ��� �
��� � ��
��  , 0). 
3.  THE PROFIT ALLOCATION MODEL 
BASED ON REVISED SHAPELY VALUE
3.1  Classic Shapely Value
Shapely Method is a classic approach to solve the profit (or 
cost) allocation problem of n-person collaborative game. 
Let n denote the number of players. N={1,2,…,n} N 
denotes the set of all the players . A coalition is any subset 
? ? ? . The characteristic function V(S) is the largest 
guaranteed payoff to the coalition S, where ???? ? ?  and 
���� � ∑ �������� .
 
 
Let xi be a real number for each ? ? ? ,  which 
represents the share of the value of V(N) received by 
player i. Then an allocation X=(x1,x2,…,xn) is called the 
Shapely value if 
 �� � � ����� � ��� � ���
�|�| � ��! �|�| � |�|�!
|�|!
������
                  (1)
where Πi is the set of all coalitions ? ? ? containing i as 
a member. |S| and |N| denote the number of members in 
S and N respectively. Notice that Shapely value satisfies 
the individual rationality (xi≥ V(i)), as well as group 
rationality (∑ ������ � �����). 
 
.
The classic Shapely method distributes profit based 
on the marginal contribution of alliance members 
respectively, which avoids equal distribution. However, 
this method supposes that each alliance member has the 
same impact level to the profit allocation, which can be 
expressed in probability 
1
� . In practice, corporate internal 
peculiarities and external market circumstances both have 
obvious influences to the profit allocation of alliances. 
Therefore, we need to revise the classic Shapely method 
to improve its rationality and equity.
3.2  The Revised Impact Factor Set 
According to the analysis in chapter 2, we build the 
revised impact factor set as shown in Table 1, where 
denotes the value of impact factor j for enterprise i 
(i=1,2,…,n; j=1,2,..,5).
Table 1
The Revised Impact Factor Set of Profit Allocation
Impact Factor Input cost value (cvi)
Risk share 
coefficient(cri)
Leadership in industry
(θi)
Market influence(si)
Desire of 
participation(hi)
Enterprise 1 a11 a12 a13 a14 a15
Enterprise 2 a21 a22 a23 a24 a25
… … … … … …
Enterprise n an1 an2 an3 an4 an5
Then normalize the impact factor set. Let ��� �
���
∑ �����
  
where.  denotes the revised impact factor 
matrix after normalization. Therefore, 
  ? ? ???????? ? ?
??? ??? ???
??? ??? ???
? ? ?
??? ??? ???
??? ???
??? ???
? ?
??? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????? . (2)
3.3  Revised Shapely Value
Since the importance of different impact factors varies 
a lot, it is suggested to consult experts about the weight 
coefficient of them. Let φj denote the weight coefficient 
of impact factor j, where 0≤φj ≤1. Thus the weight vector . 
? ? ???，??，??，??，?????  . Because the factor 5, 
desire of participation, has negative impact on the profit 
allocation, so the coefficient of φ5 is minus. Let I denote 
the comprehensive impact coefficient vector:
  ? ? ???? ???? ? ???? ? ? ? ???  . (3)
Therefore the revised Shapely value of enterprise i is
 x����� � ����� � ��� �
1
�� � ����� � � �1� �� . (4)
The revised Shapely value considers the synthetic 
effect of different impact factors, and improves the equity, 
rationality and objectivity of profit allocation.
4 .  A N  E X A M P L E  O F  P R O F I T 
A L L O C A T I O N  U N D E R  T H E 
CIRCUMSTANCE OF WAREHOUSE 
OVERLOAD
4.1  Model of Warehouse Overload
Let n be the number of E-commerce logistics enterprises 
who handle the warehouse overload problem together, 
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and set N={1,2,…,n}. Qi denotes the number of express 
parcels that enterprise i delivers. Qi' denotes the maximum 
processing ability of enterprise i,? ? ? . It is obvious that 
Qi>Qi' when warehouse is overloaded. Ci denotes the unit 
express delivery cost of enterprise i. Ri denotes the unit 
express delivery risk of enterprise i. CRi denotes the unit 
express delivery failure cost of enterprise i. TCi denotes 
the total cost of enterprise i. 
Suppose that when Qi≤Qi', enterprise can insure the 
security and timeliness of express delivery, then Ri=0. 
Inversely, when Qi>Qt', the number of express parcels 
exceeds the enterprise’s maximum processing ability, 
where risks emerge and Ri>0. Therefore, 
  ��� � �� � �� � ��� � ���� � �� � ���   . (5)
Similarly, let set ? ? N and ? ? ? . Then �� � ∑ �����  
denotes the number of express parcels that alliance S 
delivers. ��� � ∑ ������   denotes the maximum processing 
ability of alliance S. Ci denotes the unit express delivery 
cost of alliance S. RS denotes the unit express delivery risk 
of alliance S. CRS denotes the unit express delivery failure 
cost of alliance S. TCS denotes the total cost of alliance S. 
After  the establ ishment  of  al l iance,  member 
enterprises can reduce logistics cost and avoid delivery 
risk by sharing customer information, scheduling 
logistics infrastructure as a whole, and optimizing 
distribution routes (Ergun, Kuyzu, & Savelsbergh, 2007). 
Therefore,?? ? ??? ?? ? ??? ??? ? ???  , and 
  
.
 (6)
4.2  Parameters Settings
Suppose that there are 3 E-commerce logistics enterprises which are the detailed settings of model parameters is shown 
in Table 2. 
Table 2
Parameters Settings
Content Parameter value Unit
Unit express delivery cost CA=CB=CC=10,CAB=CAC=CBC=8,CABC=6 RMB/unit
Amount of express parcels QA=50000, QB=30000, QC=20000 Unit
Maximum processing ability QA'=40000,QB'=20000 , QC'=10000 Unit
Unit express delivery risk RA=RB=RC=10%,RAB=RAC=RBC=8%, RABC=5% /
Unit express delivery failure cost CRa=CRb=CRc=20,CRAB=CRAC=RRBC=15,CRABC=10 RMB/unit
By Formulas (5), (6), the computation results are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3
Computation Results
Total cost/RMB Overall cost of system/RMB
TCA=520000, TCB=320000, TCC=220000 TCA+TCB+TCC=1060000
TCAB=664000
TCAC=584000
TCBC=424000
TCAB+TCC=884000
TCAC+TCB=904000
TCBC+TCA=944000
TCABC=615000 TCABC=615000
TCABC=615000 has the minimum overall cost of system, which equally means that enterprise A, B and C can get 
maximum extra profit by collaborating. Therefore, we use Shapely method to allocate the profit, in other words, the 
saved cost.
4.3  Profit Allocation Based on Classic Shapely Value
Let characteristic function V be the saved cost of alliance, then
���� � �� ���� � ��B� � ���� � �
��� � �� � ��� � ��� � ����=176000
��� � �� � ��� � ��� � ����=156000
��� � �� � ��� � ��� � ����=116000 
��� � � � �� � ��� � ��� � ��� � �����=445000
 
By Formula (1) we obtain: ����� �
1
3 � � �
1
6 � 1�6��� �
1
6 � 1�6��� �
1
3 � 3����� � 16���� . Similarly, xB 
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(V)=145000, xC (V)=135000. If we transform the Shapely 
values into the total cost respectively, we obtain:
Enterprise: TCA-xA (V)=520000-165000=355000
Enterprise: TCB-xB (V)=320000-145000=175000
Enterprise: TCC-xC (V)=220000-135000=85000
4.4 Profit Allocation Based on Revised Shapely 
Value
According to the expertise and enterprise investigation, 
the revised impact factor set B after normalization is 
shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Parameters Settings of Impact Factor Set 
Impact factor Input cost value (cei)
Risk share coefficient 
(cri)
Leadership in industry
(θi)
Market influence 
(si)
Desire of 
participation (hi)
Enterprise 39.1% 33.3% 66.6% 50.0% 20.0%
Enterprise 34.8% 33.3% 16.7% 30.0% 30.0%
Enterprise 26.1% 33.3% 16.7% 20.0% 50.0%
Similarly, the weight vector φ is:
φ=(0.50, 0.15, 0.15, 0.15, 0.05)T .
By Formula (3), we obtain:
� � ���� ��� ���� � �
39.1% 33.3% 66.6%
34.8% 33.3% 16.7%
26.1% 33.3% 16.7%
50.0% 20.0%
30.0% 30.0%
20.0% 50.0%
� �
�
�
�
0.50
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.05�
�
�   
� �0.43� 0.31�0.26��. 
By Formula (4), we obtain: 
��� ��� � ����� � ��� �
1
3� � ���� � 1����� � ����3 �
1
3� � ������ � ����1��� .
Similarly xB' (V)=134616.7, xC' (V)=102366.6. If we 
transform the revised Shapely values into the total cost 
respectively, we obtain:
Enterprise :TCA-xA' (V)=520000-208016.7=311983.3
Enterprise :TCB-xB' (V)=320000-134616.7=185383.3
Enterprise :TCC-xC' (V)=220000-102366.6=117633.4
The contrast before and after the revision can be seen 
in Table 5. Enterprise  has higher values in impact factors 
like input cost value, leadership in industry and market 
influence, which means it owns great discourse power 
and makes more contributions to the alliance. Therefore 
enterprise  gains higher profit (saved cost) accordingly. 
Inversely, enterprise B and C, with lower negotiation 
ability, are on common status in the alliance, thus their 
revised Shapely values are lower than classic ones. In 
general, the revised Shapely value truly reflects the 
predominant and pivotal effect of core enterprises during 
the operation of alliance, and improves the equity and 
rationality of traditional profit allocation.
Table 5
Contrast Before and After the Revision
Enterprise Classic shapely value Revised shapely value Total cost before revise Total cost after revise
A 165000.0 208016.7 355000.0 311983.3
B 145000.0 134616.7 175000.0 185383.3
C 135000.0 102366.6 85000.0 117633.4
CONCLUSION
Even though many E-commerce logistics enterprises 
have made great  progress,  the present logist ics 
infrastructure and information level cannot fully adapt 
to the fast development of E-commerce. Therefore, win-
win collaboration becomes an important approach for 
E-commerce logistics enterprises to face short-term 
challenges and achieve long-term development. However, 
whether it can realize effective collaboration or not 
depends on a reasonable and equitable profit allocation. 
This paper revises the classic Shapely value from aspects 
of input cost value, risk share coefficient, leadership in the 
industry, market influence and the desire of participation, 
and demonstrates the feasibility of revised Shapely value 
through a numerical example of warehouse overload. The 
result indicates that the revised Shapely value can reflect 
the regulating effect of different impact factors, show the 
difference between the core enterprise and other common 
members in the alliance, and improve the equity and 
rationality of profit allocation.
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